



Article Assessing Determinants of Compliance with Contribution Payment for the National Health Insurance among Informal Workers in Indonesia

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Abstract: This study aimed to investigate the determinants of compliance with contribu-11 tion payment for the National Health Insurance among informal workers in Bogor Re-12 gency, West Java Province, Indonesia. Surveys of 418 informal workers in Bogor Regency 13 from April to May 2023 were conducted. Multivariate logistic regression analyses were 14 performed to assess the factors associated with informal workers' compliance with con-15 tribution payment. The results revealed that being female, having secondary education or 16 below, perceiving to have a good health status, having a negative attitude towards and 17 poor knowledge of the NHI, ever experiencing financial difficulties, preferring to visit 18 other types of health facilities than public ones, and utilizing fewer outpatient services 19 were significantly associated with the non-compliance of informal workers with the NHI 20 contribution payment. It was concluded that economic factors alone cannot contribute to 21 informal workers payment compliance with the NHI contribution. Motivational factors 22 (knowledge, attitude towards the insurance system, and self-related health status) simul-23 taneously encourage respondents to comply with the contribution payment. Enhancing 24 people's knowledge, especially the risk-sharing concept of the NHI, should be done 25 through extensive health insurance education using proper methods subject to the popu-26 lation's characteristics. 27

Keywords: informal workers; National Health Insurance; payment compliance

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1. Introduction

Having prioritized achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC), low- and middle-31 income countries (LMICs) have faced various obstacles. Many health care systems' ability 32 to provide access to high-quality health care services has been hampered by a lack of pre-33 payment mechanisms as well as the lack of tools and resources to pool risks. As a result, 34 many health systems in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have relied heavily 35 on out-of-pocket (OOP) spending to pay for medical care for decades [1], which accounts 36 for 30% to 85% of the entire cost of health care. At the end, these countries are financially 37 burdened by catastrophic illnesses as a result of high out-of-pocket charges [2]. It was 38 reported that around 808 million people in 2010 incurred catastrophic health care spend-39 ing [3], which had been increasing constantly between 2000 and 2017 [4] 40

Social Health Insurance (SHI), which contains contribution and non-contribution 41 schemes, has been shown to be the most used strategy for generating income and pulling 42 funds to pay for medical services, as lessons learned from numerous countries that have 43 effectively implemented UHC [5]. Positive impacts are seen after the SHI's implementa-
tion, including the increasing of health care utilization [6, 7, 8], improving health quality
[9, 10], reducing in OOP [11], and health care expenditures covered by the SHI [12]. How-
ever, several challenges had arisen for the contribution scheme of SHI, namely, low en-
rollment [13, 14], adverse selection [15, 16], and dropout participants [17, 18], particularly
among informal workers.44

Indonesia has been striving to achieve universal health coverage (UHC) since 2002 50 and has taken an advanced step by implementing the SHI named National Health Insur-51 ance (JKN) since 2014 [17], which was noted as the largest single-payer scheme in the 52 world, supervised by the Social Security Agency for Health (SSAH). The eligibility of in-53 patient services was divided into three classes of membership: class 1 (contribution 54 amount of USD 9.92 per person) for the formal sector salaried above USD 264.6 and the 55 informal sector; class 2 (contribution amount of USD 6.61 per person) for the formal sector 56 salaried equal to USD 264.6 or less and the informal sector; and class 3 (contribution 57 amount of USD 2.77 per person) for the poor and vulnerable group, or informal sector. 58 While the contribution of the formal sector was paid proportionally (1% paid by the em-59 ployee and 4% paid by the employer), the poor and vulnerable were paid by the govern-60 ment, and the informal sector paid the contribution themselves, except for class 3, for 61 whom the government provided subsidies of about 16.6% of the contribution [19]. All 62 family members' contributions were bound together as one. 63

Following the NHI's implementation, the NHI's coverage increased rapidly from 64 66.5% in 2016 to 91.7% by December 2022, and the total contribution revenue increased 65 from USD 5 billion in 2016 to USD 8.2 billion. Along with that, health care expenditure 66 rose from USD 5 billion in 2016 to USD 7.3 billion in December 2022 [20, 21]. Despite the 67 positive effects, the financial sustainability issue of the NHI program remain concerning 68 due to the increased number of non-compliant PBPU participants (informal workers) pay-69 ing the NHI contribution [19]. Among 12.3% of the informal workers who registered NHI 70 as PBPU members, 51% of them were recorded to have stopped making the NHI contri-71 bution by December 2022 [21]. the average medical cost to average contribution ratio re-72 ported increased from 115% by 2015 to 124% by 2019, driven by the informal workers, 73 who previously did not pay the contribution regularly; this ratio is supposed not to exceed 74 100% [22]. 75

Banerjee et al. [23] stated that enforcing the members in the contributory scheme by 76 implementing several sanctions might turn out to be a toothless mandate and create low 77 program enrollment, adverse selection, and a tendency to discontinue paying the NHI 78 membership, especially among informal workers [17, 18]. Lack of money to pay the con-79 tribution [17, 24], an unaffordable contribution [18], not needing insurance again after rare 80 illness episodes (usually among the young) [25], perceived poor quality of service of the 81 providers [26], forgetting to pay [18], and a negative providers' attitude [25] are several 82 justifications for their decision to be non-compliant participants. On the other hand, 83 Dartanto et al. [17] stated that the irregularity of income characteristic of informal workers 84 influences their economic capability more than their household monthly income. The in-85 security of receiving the same amount each month, despite the fact that informal employ-86 ees can earn more money at once, makes it challenging to pay the NHI contributions, 87 which must be made on time each month. 88

For years, SSAH had experienced financial hardship and struggled to provide health care services due to the imbalance of revenue collection in the NHI and increased health care spending [27]. Although the government has regulated various regulations to enlighten the non-compliant participants and provide conveniences for them to pay the arrears effortlessly, these have not had a significant impact, and the number of non-compliant participants has continued to rise.

Moreover, characteristics relating to the family members' perceived health risks appeared to receive less attention in the earlier study. Most of the previous studies measured these factors as individuals, while the health insurance scheme was family-based. Having 97 one or more family members with health risks might motivate the participants to adhere98to the NHI contribution payment [26, 28] due to a greater demand for health insurance,99which is a solution to increase access to formal care and reduce out-of-pocket expenses100[29]. By counting the factors related to the health risks faced by family members, this study101aims to investigate the determinants of compliance with the NHI contribution payment102among informal workers in Indonesia.103

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Study design and participants

This research was conducted as a quantitative cross-sectional study through face-to-106face surveys from April 2023 to May 2023. The questionnaires were modified from previ-107ous studies [13, 17, 30].108

Figure 1 describes the methodology for selecting the study area. Java Island was de-109 liberately chosen. To select the region, preliminary data on non-compliant informal work-110 ers in all areas of Java Island was provided by the SSAH office, with the highest number 111 of non-compliant informal worker participants as a prerequisite. Consequently, Bogor Re-112 gency was selected among 34 cities and 85 regencies, with a total of 596 thousand non-113 compliant informal worker participants among 1 million informal worker participants (a 114 rate of 59.35%). After that, two districts in urban and rural areas were randomly selected. 115 Further, conforming to the availability of the SSAH office, three wards and nine villages 116 were approached. The list of informal worker participants from the SSAH database was 117 subsequently synchronized with the local government database. A quota sampling 118 method of approximately 50% of each characteristic (compliance and non-compliance) 119 was utilized to obtain the representative sample. Lastly, as a household unit, the partici-120 pants were chosen randomly. 121




Figure 1. Sampling flow of the study

The formula proposed by Rea [31] was used to determine the sample size. It was 127 decided to use a 95% confidence interval with a 5% (MEp) allowable error. The level of 128 non-compliance was set at 50% in order to enable the collection of a large sample size (p). 129 The sample size was increased by 10% to account for non-responding participants, resulting in 422 people in the final sample size. Informal workers who had registered as PBPU 131 NHI participants, were at least 18 years old, and are willing to engage in a survey with 132 written consent were included in this study. 133

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2.2.1 The compliance with the NHI contribution payment

The participants' compliance with paying the NHI contribution was reflected in their NHI membership status, either active or non-active. Participants with an active NHI status were considered compliant, and those with a non-active NHI membership status were considered non-compliant. The validation of the informal worker's NHI membership status was determined from the data list of informal worker participants and their NHI membership status provided by the BPJS Kesehatan or mobile JKN application.

To conduct the study, a theory of motivation-opportunity-ability (MOA) by Folke

Olander and John Thogersen [30] was adapted to describe the association between inde-

pendent variables and the compliance of the participants in paying the NHI contribution.

2.2.2 Sociodemographic characteristics

In this section, six questions pertaining to the participants' general information, including their living region (urban or rural), age, gender, education, occupation, and family size, were asked.

2.2.3 Motivational factors

There are three subsections under the heading of motivation factors. First, the per-154 ceived health risks faced by the family members were consisted of five questions, adapted 155 from Ashagrie et al. [28], including the self-rated health status, the presence of family 156 members suffering from a chronic disease, recent illness history, the presence of the el-157 derly in the family, and the presence of children under five years of age. The self-rated 158 health status in this section included the health status of all family members, scaled from 159 very poor (scored as 1) to very good (scored as 5), with the average total score used for 160 categorizing. This was based on the consideration of the possibility that another family 161 member's health status might affect the decision to pay the contribution, as the contribu-162 tion payment is family-based. Second, seven scaled statements, modified from Kaso et al. 163 [32], were performed to measure the perceived quality of service provided by the provid-164 ers, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.89. Lastly, attitude towards NHI was comprised of six 165 Likert scale statements, adapted from a previous study [32], with a Cronbach alpha of 166 0.91. Medians of the total score were used for categorizing both variables. 167

2.2.4 Opportunity factors

The opportunity factors contain two subsections. First, access to the health facilities 170 was divided into two categories: less than 30 minutes and equal to 30 minutes or above, 171 according to the average walking velocity of young adults [33]. Second, the health care 172 service utilization was composed of five questions related to treatment seeking behavior, 173 the type of health facilities visited, the outpatient and inpatient services visited in the last 174 twelve months et al. [34], and the cost incurred prior to joining the NHI, which were 175 adapted from Eseta et al. [35].

2.2.5 Ability factors

Two subsections were covered in the ability factors. Knowledge of the NHI program 179 is assessed with ten questions related to the NHI program with domains: the basic princi-180ple of NHI's implementation, the aim of the NHI, the contribution amount, the inpatient-181 fine charge, the benefit package, the cost-sharing payment concept, and the risk-sharing 182 concept, adapted from previous studies [32, 36]. The correct answer scored 1, and the in-183 correct answer scored 0. Income stability was measured by using closed-ended binary 184questions related to the determination of income received each month and the experience 185 of having financial difficulties. 186

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Face validity and content validity were performed to validate the questionnaire. The188meaning, difficulty, and ambiguity of each questionnaire item were evaluated by four experts in related fields. The item-objective congruence (IOC) score was calculated, and a189perts in related fields. The item-objective congruence (IOC) score was calculated, and a190score equal to 0.5 or greater than 0.5 was considered acceptable. Consequently, one question related to their NHI card number was removed due to a score of IOC < 0.5. In addition, a pre-test of 30 informal worker participants in another area with similar character-</td>193istics to the study area was conducted to measure the reliability of the questionnaire.194

Afterwards, with approval from the Committee for Research Ethics of Mahidol Uni-195 versity Social Science Independent Review Board COA No. 2023/059.1904, a data request 196 support letter for informal workers registered as NHI participants to the related depart-197 ment in BPJS Kesehatan (SSAH) was issued. The list of informal worker participants was 198 provided by the Cibinong branch office of BPJS Kesehatan and held by the NHI cadres to 199 maintain confidentiality, and their addresses and availability were subsequently synchro-200 nized with the local government's data. Four trained research assistants holding a bache-201 lor's degree collected the data through face-to-face interviews using paper-based ques-202 tionnaires, accompanied by NHI cadres. Before collecting the data, the objectives of the 203 study were briefly described, and the respondent's agreement to participate in the survey 204 was asked by signing the written consent letter. Respondents were given a code with a 205 number according to their order on the respondent's list. Further, all data collected was 206 rechecked for completeness daily. Some of the inappropriate data was confirmed by using 207 the mobile JKN application. 208

2.4. Statistical analysis

SPSS version 21 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA) was applied for data analysis. The 210 results were presented in numbers, percentages, means, medians, standard deviations or 211 quartile deviations, and ranges. The associations between the determinant factors and the 212 payment compliance of the respondents in paying the premium were assessed by chi-213 square tests. Further, the predictors of the outcome variable were evaluated through mul-214 tivariate logistic regression at a 0.5 significance level. Multicollinearity among independ-215 ent variables was determined by measuring the coefficient value of the Spearman corre-216 lation test. A coefficient value of less than 0.75 indicated that there was no strong associa-217 tion between independent variables. 218

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive results of independent variables

A total of 431 participants took part in the surveys from three wards in Cibinong 221 District (an urban area) and nine villages in Bojonggede District (a rural area). About 418 222 complete questionnaires were entered in the data analysis, while 13 incomplete data were 223 excluded. With regards, the results showed that 51.7% of the participants reported not 224 complying with paying the NHI contribution, while their counterparts were about 48.3%. 225

Table 1 illustrates the sociodemographic characteristics of the participants. It was reported that 50.5% of the participants lived in rural areas, and 49.5% lived in urban areas.226Most of the participants were in the 36–45 age group (38.5%), males (62.9%), and completed higher than secondary education (71.3%). Participants who worked in the service229sector and industry sector were around 46.7% and 14.4%, respectively, whereas 39.0%230worked in the other sectors. More than half of the participants (58.1%) had a family size231equal to four family members or above.232

As shown in Table 2, according to the perceived health risks faced by family members, less than one-third of the participants admitted to having a poor health status (27.0%), while more than two-thirds admitted their family was healthy (73.0%). The majority of the respondents did not have any family members who had experienced illness recently and did not have a chronic disease (88.3% and 80.4%, respectively). Only a few (9.1%) of the respondents had one or more elderly people in their family. Similarly, less 238

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than one-third (23.4%) of the participants had one or several children under five in their 239 family. 240

Overall, the participants indicated having a good perception of the quality of service 241 provided by the providers (67.9%), a positive attitude towards NHI (53.6%), and a good 242 understanding of the NHI program (68.2%). Details are described in Table 3. Similarly, in 243 the perceived quality of services provided by the provider variable, nearly half of the par-244 ticipants were unsure about their satisfaction related to the waiting time at the outpatient 245 service, while most of them agreed with the other six positive statements (Table 4). In their 246 attitude towards NHI, around one-third (31.8%) of them reported not being sure regard-247 ing the improvement of drug availability after the NHI's implementation (Table 5). Be-248 sides, none of the participants strongly disagreed with each statement about the perceived 249 quality of services provided by the provider and their attitude towards NHI. For 250 knowledge about the NHI program, less than half of the respondents were able to answer 251 a question related to service coverage in contract and non-contract health facilities cor-252 rectly (34.7%), whereas for the other questions, the majority of them could answer cor-253 rectly (Table 6). 254

Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics (n = 418)	Table 1.	. Sociodemogr	aphic chara	acteristics ((n = 418)	
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Characteristics	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Area		~
Rural	211	50.5
Urban	207	49.5
Age (years)		
18-35	100	23.9
36-45	161	38.5
> 45	157	37.6
Gender		
Male	263	62.9
Female	155	37.1
Education level		
Primary school or less	54	12.9
Secondary school	66	15.8
Higher education	298	71.3
Occupation		
Industry sector	60	14.4
Service sector	195	46.7
Others	163	39.0
Family size (members)		
< 4	175	41.9
≥ 4	243	58.1
Table 2. Perceived health risk faced	l by family members	
Characteristics	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Self-rated health status		
Poor	113	27.0
Good	305	73.0
Recent illness experience		
No	369	88.3
Yes	49	11.7
The presence of family member with	th a chronic disease	
No	336	80.4
Yes	82	19.6
The presence of elderly people		
None	380	90.9
One or several	38	9.1

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None 320 76.6	The presence of children under the	age of five	
	None	320	76.6
One or several 98 23.4	One or several	98	23.4

Table 3. Level of participants perception of the quality of service provided by the providers, attitude towards NHI, and knowledge of the NHI program (n = 418)

Items	Number (n)	Percentage (%)
Perceived quality of service provided by the provider		
Poor	134	32.1
Good	284	67.9
Median 26, Q.D 1.5, Range 17-35		
Attitude towards NHI		
Negative	194	46.4
Positive	224	53.6
Median 24, Q.D 1, Range 13-30		
Knowledge of the NHI program		
Poor	133	31.8
Good	285	68.2
Median 8, Q.D 1.5, Range 1-10		

Table 4. Perceived quality of service of the providers (n = 418)				
Items	Disagree n (%)	Neutral n (%)	Agree n (%)	Strongly Agree n (%)
The health service providers provide equal treatment to NHI and non-NHI participants.	39 (9.3)	61 (14.6)	312 (74.6)	6 (1.4)
The physician visited you or your family frequently when you or your fam- ily were hospitalized.	6 (1.4)	105 (25.1)	303 (72.5)	4 (1.0)
The physicians clearly described your or your family's disease (the cause and the treatment process).	5 (1.2)	76 (18.2)	333 (79.7)	4 (1.0)
The physician was available according to the polyclinic schedule.	13 (3.1)	81 (19.4)	322 (77.0)	2 (0.5)
The provider's staff (the physicians, the nurses, the administration officers, and other hospital staff) served you or your family friendliness.	3 (0.7)	133 (31.8)	278 (66.5)	4 (1.0)
The waiting time from registration until the physician served you at the outpatient service satisfied you.	109 (26.1)	178 (42.6)	128 (30.6)	3 (0.7)
The provider's staff gave clear information (direction to get the services) and handled your or your family's yelps well.	1 (0.2)	148 (35.4)	266 (63.6)	3 (0.7)

Table 5. Attitude towards NHI (n = 418)				
Items	Disagree n (%)	Neutral n (%)	Agree n (%)	Strongly Agree n (%)
NHI makes health care affordable.	1 (0.2)	44 (10.5)	363 (86.8)	10 (2.4)
NHI reduces the burden of health care spending.	1 (0.2)	42 (10.0)	364 (87.1)	11 (2.6)
NHI increases access to health care services.	0 (0.0)	54 (12.9)	357 (85.4)	7 (1.7)
The quality of services provided by the provider had improved after the NHI implementation.	17 (4.1)	91 (21.8)	305 (73.0)	5 (1.2)
The availability of drugs at the health facilities had improved after the NHI's implementation.	38 (9.1)	133 (31.8)	244 (58.4)	3 (0.7)
The NHI Committee (SSAH) manages pooled funds very well.	10 (2.4)	87 (20.8)	318 (76.1)	3 (0.7)

Table 6. Knowledge of the NHI program

Itoma	Correc	2t
Items	Number (n)	Percentage (%)
The principle of NHI is mutual cooperation.	388	92.8

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The aim of the NHI is to protect people from fall-		
ing into poverty if they suffer from diseases, es-	392	93.8
pecially diseases with high costs.		
Table 6. Cont.		
	Corre	ct
Items —	Number (n)	Percentage (%
The monthly contribution of the 3 rd class of NHI		
is IDR 35 thousand, the 2 nd class of NHI is IDR 100	264	071
thousand, and the 1st class of NHI is IDR 150 thou-	364	87.1
sand.		
The monthly contribution amount must be paid	249	02.2
no later than the 10 th day of each month.	348	83.3
People will be fined for inpatient service fees		
within 45 days after the contributions or arrears	294	70.3
are paid.		
NHI covers health services from contract and	145	247
non-contract providers.	145	34.7
NHI covers simple (example: upper respiratory		
infection, fever, or headache) and complex dis-	376	90.0
eases (example: open heart surgery or chemother-	376	90.0
apy), whether outpatient or inpatient services.		
Cosmetic surgery, services that are not in accord-		
ance with the provisions, self-defeating diseases,	241	57.7
and occupational diseases are outside the cover-	241	57.7
age of the NHI.		
Cost sharing will be charged for executive clinics		
and room type upgrades for inpatient health ser-	242	57.9
vices.		
If you never use NHI to get treatment, your		
money for paying the contribution will not be re-	382	91.4
turned.		

The majority of the participants admitted to not having a fixed amount of monthly 271 income (89.7%) and having experienced financial difficulties (77.5%). In the health care 272 service utilization factors, more than three-quarters of the participants (75.6%) could ac-273 cess the health facilities from their homes in less than 30 minutes, while 24.4% of them 274 took 30 minutes or more. Most of the participants visited the health facilities if they were 275 sick (84.7%) and preferred to choose public (58.1%). Even so, only a few of them utilized 276 outpatient services equal to four or above (15.6%) and utilized inpatient services once or 277 more (11.0%). About 89.5% of the participants admitted spending equal to IDR 1 million 278 or less for inpatient services prior to joining NHI (Table 7). 279

Characteristics	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
	Income stability	
Have a fixed amount of income p	per month	
No	375	89.7
Yes	43	10.3
Experienced financial difficulties		
No	94	22.5
Yes	324	77.5

Table 7. Income stability and health care service utilization

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89.5

10.5

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Characteristics	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%
Н	ealth care service utilization	
Distance to reach the health facil	lities (in minute)	
< 30 minutes	316	27.0
≥ 30 minutes	102	73.0
Median 20, Q.D 5, Range 5-120		
Treatment seeking behavior		
No	64	88.3
Yes	354	11.7
The type of health facilities visited		
Public	243	27.0
Private	138	73.0
Others	37	
Outpatient services utilization in the	e last 12 months	
Never or once	353	88.3
More than once	65	11.7
Inpatient services utilization in the	last 12 months	
Never	372	80.4
Once or more	46	19.6

3.2. Association between independent variables and compliance with the NHI contribution payment

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Cost incurred for the inpatient service prior to joining NHI

 $IDR \le 1$ million

IDR > 1 million

The chi-square tests, bivariate analysis, and multivariate analysis were performed 286 in Table 8. The chi-square tests were conducted to assess the association between the in-287 dependent variables and the participants' compliance with contribution payment for the 288 NHI. Furthermore, the multicollinearity among independent variables was determined 289 by the Spearman correlation test. The coefficient value of the Spearmen correlation test 290 should not be greater than 0.75. The result showed that none of the independent variables 291 had a coefficient value greater than 0.75. 292

The final model multivariate logistic regression results implied that female informal 293 workers were 6.56 times (p < 0.001) less likely to comply with paying the NHI contribution 294 compared to their counterparts. Informal workers who completed secondary education 295 or lower were found to be 7.52 times less likely to comply with the NHI contribution pay-296 ment compared to those who completed higher education levels (p 0.001). Being healthy 297 influenced the non-compliance of informal workers in paying the NHI contribution 5.18 298 times (p < 0.001). Further, having a negative attitude towards NHI and poor knowledge 299 of the NHI program contributed to the non-compliance of informal worker payment with 300 the NHI contribution payment about 2.66 times (p 0.050) and 4.94 times (p 0.004), respec-301 tively. Ever experienced financial difficulties made a higher probability of being less likely 302 to comply about 4.64 times with the NHI contribution payment (p 0.005). Likewise, infor-303 mal workers who preferred to go to other types of health facilities rather than public 304 health facilities to seek treatment were 4.55 times (p 0.001) less likely to comply with the 305 NHI contribution payment. Participants who never utilized or utilized outpatient services 306 only once in the last 12 months have an 8.35 times (p < 0.001) lower likelihood of comply-307 ing with the NHI contribution payment as opposed to those who utilized them more.

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		Pavment	compliance		÷ ,		
	Variables		Non-compliance (%)	CORa (95% CI)c	<i>p</i> -Value	AORb (95% CI)	<i>p-</i> Value
Age (ye	ars)	,	())				
0.1	8-35	32.0	68.0	2.69 (1.59-4.54)	0.001		
	6-45	55.9	44.1	1			
	45	51.0	49.0	1.22 (0.78-1.89)	0.377		
Sex	-						
Μ	fale	65.8	34.2	1		1	
Fe	emale	18.7	81.3	8.35 (5.18-13.46)	< 0.001	6.56 (2.59-16.61)	< 0.001
Educatio	on level					, ,	
Se	econdary or below	5.8	94.2	30.56 (13.73-68.00)	< 0.001	7.52 (2.39-23.57)	0.001
	ligher than secondary	65.4	34.6	1		1	
	d health status						
	oor	82.3	17.7	1		1	
	Good	35.7	64.3	8.36 (4.88-14.30)	< 0.001	5.18 (1.55-17.30)	0.007
	ence of family member with a c		0110	0.00 (1.00 11.00)	01001		0.007
N	5	43.5	56.5	2.80 (1.67-4.68)	< 0.001		
	es	68.3	31.7	1			
	ence of elderly people						
-	Ione	52.1	47.9	1			
	ne or several	10.5	89.5	9.24 (3.21-26.56)	< 0.001		
	ence of children under the age of						
-	lone	51.9	48.1	1			
	ne or several	36.7	63.3	1.85 (1.16-2.95)	0.009		
	d quality of services provided b		00.0	1.00 (1.10 2.90)	0.007		
	oor	29.1	70.9	3.28 (2.11-5.09)	< 0.001		
	Good	57.4	42.6	1	.0.001		
	towards NHI	07.1	12.0	1			
	legative	32.5	67.5	3.40 (2.27-5.09)	< 0.001	2.66 (1.00-7.11)	0.050
	ositive	62.1	37.9	1	× 0.001	1	0.000
	lge of NHI	02.1	07.0	Ĩ		1	
	oor	14.3	85.7	10.76 (6.25-18.52)	< 0.001	4.94 (1.66-14.67)	0.004
	Good	64.2	35.8	10.70 (0.25-18.52)	< 0.001	4.94 (1.00-14.07)	0.004
Fix incon		04.2	55.6	L		L	
FIX IIICOII N		53.1	46.9	1			
	es	7.0	93.0	15.07 (4.58-49.58)	< 0.001		
	ced financial difficulties	7.0	<i>)3</i> .0	13.07 (4.30-47.30)	< 0.001		
		84.0	16.0	1		1	
N	es	84.0 38.0	62.0	8.60 (4.74-15.61)	< 0.001	4.64 (1.59-13.56)	0.005
		36.0	02.0	8.00 (4.74-13.01)	< 0.001	4.04 (1.59-13.50)	0.005
	of health facilities (minutes) 30	FE 1	44.0	1			
		55.1	44.9		. 0. 001		
	30	27.5	72.5	3.23 (1.98-5.27)	< 0.001		
	nt-seeking behavior	20.2	70 7		< 0.001		
N		20.3	79.7	4.49 (2.36-8.55)	< 0.001		
	es	53.4	46.6	1			
• •	of health facilities visited		22.4	4			
	ublic	67.9	32.1	1		1	
	Others	23.4	76.6	6.95 (4.48-10.77)	< 0.001	4.55 (1.92-10.77)	0.001
-	ent services utilization in the las						
	lever or once	29.4	70.6	8.10 (5.15-12.73)	< 0.001	8.35 (3.02-23.06)	< 0.001
M	fore than once	77.1	22.9	1		1	

Table 8. Multiple logistic regression of the association between independent variables and	313
the informal worker's compliance with the NHI contribution payment ($n = 418$)	314

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Table								
	Payment compliance		COR		AOBL			
Variables	Compliance (%)	Non-compliance (%)	CORa (95% CI)c	<i>p</i> -Value	AORb (95% CI)	<i>p</i> -Value		
Inpatient services utilization in the last 12 months								
Never	45.4	54.6	3.04 (1.55-5.97)	0.001				
Once or more	71.7	28.3	1					

Notes: a = *crude odds ratio, b* = *adjusted odds ratio, c* = *confidence interval*

4. Discussion

Indonesia, a low-middle-income country that is heavily populated and has been 320 planning to attain UHC since 2002, performed the National Health Insurance entitled Ja-321 minan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) 2014 under the SSAH supervision, which is the largest 322 single payer in the world, as part of its ambitious national health insurance program. De-323 spite this, providing accessible and affordable health care services appeared to be a chal-324 lenge due to the high percentage of informal workers who did not comply with paying 325 the NHI contribution, which increased the financial burden placed on SSAH due to the 326 imbalance between its revenue and health care spending. Hence, the factors that affect 327 informal workers compliance with the NHI contribution payment are important to inves-328 tigate. 329

In accordance with the results of the multivariate analysis, females were 6.56 times 330 (p < 0.001) less likely to comply with paying the NHI contribution compared to their coun-331 terparts, which is contrary to the finding from a study done in northwest Ethiopia [28] 332 that showed females, as the vulnerable group, were more likely to comply with paying 333 the NHI contribution. On the other hand, Roy and Jain found that women's financial lit-334 eracy was dissatisfying. The lack of precision in insurance, saving, and investment might 335 have influenced their perception and affected how they view the significance of maintain-336 ing active insurance [37]. Completing education at the secondary level or lower has a sig-337 nificant effect of 7.52 times (p < 0.001) on informal workers' non-compliance with paying 338 JKN contributions compared to those who have completed education higher than the sec-339 ondary level. A higher education level might generate a higher income, easier access to 340 media to gather information, and a more comprehensive understanding of the benefits of 341 having health insurance [38]. 342

Since the NHI is a family-based program, we deduce that the desire to make contri-343 butions may be sparked by health issues affecting family members other than the family 344 head. In concurrence, the current study assesses the whole family member's health status 345 by utilizing the mean score for categorization to evaluate the health status of the house-346 hold. This complements the ideas of the majority of similar studies, which merely measure 347 the decision-maker's health state, which might not accurately reflect that person's motiva-348 tion for the same variable. The study finding implies that informal workers who assumed 349 their family was in good health were 5.18 times (p 0.007) less likely to comply with the 350 NHI contribution payment. [39]. This was in line with research from Ghana [29]. As stated 351 by Grossman [40], a person's capacity, willingness to pay, and conviction that they need 352 or do not require health all have an impact on demand. In fact, due to their higher risk 353 [41], vulnerable and high-risk groups demanded health care more than those who were 354 healthy [40] and were more justified in purchasing more health insurance [42] to improve 355 access to formal care and lower out-of-pocket costs [29]. Conversely, it could have been 356 predicted that health insurance would be less advantageous for health groups as their 357 demand for health declined [39]. 358

Further, a higher probability of not complying was noted among informal workers 359 who have a negative attitude towards the NHI, about 2.66 times (p 0.050) compared to 360 those positive ones. Supported by previous studies [28, 35] and the theory of planned be-361 havior by Icek [43], an in-depth understanding of the NHI and trust in well-managed 362

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health insurance might encourage a positive attitude towards the NHI and lead to positive 363 action to make contributors to the NHI more compliant. 364

The existence of elderly people and children under the age of five unexpectedly re-365 vealed negligible relationships with the informal worker's payment compliance as one of 366 the characteristics connected to perceived family health risks. Even though having senior 367 family members may increase the health risks that their families perceive, economic fac-368 tors may have made it more difficult for them to make contributions [44]. Besides, adding 369 family members increases the cost of the required contributions, increasing the financial 370 burden on the family to make these payments. The NHI's billing mechanism, however, 371 requires that all contributions from a single family be made at once. 372

The two opportunity factors that were strongly associated with the informal worker's 373 compliance with paying the NHI payments were the types of health facilities used when 374 a member of the household has a disease and the frequency of outpatient service use. 375 Informal workers were 4.55 times (p 0.001) less likely to comply with the NHI contribution 376 payment when they chose to go to other types of health facilities (private, traditional, or 377 drug store) than the public health facilities when they had a disease. According to Sharma 378 et al. [26], people who registered at private health facilities as their first point of contact 379 had a higher likelihood of being non-compliant with the NHI contribution payment. They 380 may have decided to stop offering the NHI due to service dissatisfaction [26]. Although 381 there is a significant correlation between the type of health facilities and the informal 382 workers' payment compliance, this study found that the perceived quality of services pro-383 vided by the providers was not statistically significant, suggesting that there may be ad-384 ditional aspects of the type of health facilities that affect the payment compliance of the 385 informal workers that need to be examined in future research. In addition, compared to 386 those who used outpatient healthcare services more frequently, informal workers who 387 used them less frequently in the previous 12 months have an 8.35 times (p < 0.001) higher 388 likelihood of failing to make the NHI contribution. The opportunity to learn about and 389 appreciate the value of having health insurance may have been available to those who 390 used healthcare services more frequently [45]. On the other hand, a study conducted in 391 Ethiopia [28] produced the opposite results. Frequent visits to the medical facilities could 392 exacerbate their conflicts with the doctors or the staff, leading to a lack of satisfaction with 393 the service provided by the provider and making them less inclined to trust the health 394 insurance system. 395

Concerning the ability factors, knowledge of the NHI program and the informal 396 workers' experience of having financial difficulties were the predictors of the informal 397 worker's payment compliance. Informal workers were 4.94 times (p 0.004) more likely 398 than those who knew the NHI program well to not make the required NHI contribution 399 payments. A similar result from previous studies supported this [32, 36]. This might be 400 the result of those who are knowledgeable about the NHI plan having a deeper awareness 401 of its guiding principles, benefit package, and benefits of maintaining participation in a 402 health insurance system [32]. Another argument could be that a thorough understanding 403 of NHI will improve their comprehension of the NHI notion of risk-sharing [28]. Payment 404non-compliance among informal workers was affected by their financial difficulties 405 roughly 4.64 times (p 0.005) more than it was for those who had never experienced the 406 same. A key finding from the previous study was that among informal workers, income 407 insecurity may be a contributing factor to their financial issues. The satisfaction of one's 408 basic requirements takes precedence for those who have struggled financially. Nonethe-409 less, a study on household priorities and coping mechanisms in a context without univer-410 sal health coverage came to a different conclusion [46]. People who have experienced a 411 death or a sick family member have said that while money may be found, lives are pre-412 cious and cannot be replaced, even when they have faced financial troubles and have less 413 income. This implies that there are other elements besides money that influence people's 414 decisions to get health insurance. Their drive and a key factor in keeping their health in-415 surance may come from the awful experience of illness or death. 416

Several limitations were encountered in this investigation. Regarding the diversity of 417 population characteristics in Indonesia, this study employed a small sample size and was 418 only carried out in one region, whose results could not be generalized and did not repre-419 sent the overall population of informal workers. Thus, future research was suggested to 420 pay attention to conducting research in various regions with a large sample size. Next, the 421 months of arrears were not specified in this study, and different lengths of time of lapsed 422 payment might indicate different reasons for not paying the NHI contribution. It would 423 be advantageous to obtain a more comprehensive result by including the length of the 424 months in arrears. An initial data set related to health care service utilization is suggested 425 for inclusion in subsequent studies to reduce recall bias, which emerged in this study. 426 Lastly, the current study did not evaluate the home expenses and monthly revenue of 427 informal employees. Though irregular revenue is a major problem for informal workers, 428 applying for monthly income and household expenses will be equally crucial. Despite of 429 these limitations, the current study provided a foremost thought by counting the per-430 ceived health risks faced by family members factors. With regards to our knowledge, we 431 analyze each family member's health state as a motivation to comply with making contri-432 butions, which is an addition to prior studies that mostly solely assess respondents' health. 433

5. Conclusions

Indonesia has been struggling to maintain the NHI program's sustainability in order 435 to achieve UHC since informal workers do not comply with the contributions stated in 436 the current study. The findings show that, despite the fact that irregularity of income is a 437 significant influencing factor, motivational factors and ability-related factors were simul-438 taneously identified, which influenced the behavior of the informal workers to be non-439 compliant in paying the NHI contribution. The informal workers were less inclined to 440 make the NHI contribution when they believed that their families were in good health, 441 which showed a weak willingness to share the risk with those who were ill. Instead, only 442 informal workers who utilized the health care services more frequently were more likely 443 to comply with the NHI contribution payment than those who used them less frequently, 444 which may indicate adverse selection. Hence, a thorough understanding of the risk-shar-445 ing concept of the NHI's participants should be taken into account to be improved by the 446 government to raise awareness of the noteworthiness of maintaining the NHI program 447 using appropriate methods derived from the characteristics of the population. Expanding 448 the NHI cadre's role from simply collecting the contribution to also educating NHI's par-449 ticipants through a face-to-face approach for those who are poorly educated may be more 450 practical. 451

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